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No one seems to be writing opinion pieces quite the way I would, so I decided to do it myself. The name? Taverns are places where one goes to discuss the interesting events and things in the world, so this is my tavern. I will offer my views on politics, economics, and whatever else strikes my fancy.
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Saturday, June 07, 2003
Rumsfield Knows Results He Wants - Then Collects Facts to Support Those ResultsNew York TimesJune 6, 2003 Cloaks and Daggers By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF n Day 78 of the Search for Iraqi W.M.D., yesterday, once again nothing turned up. Spooks are spitting mad at the way their work was manipulated to exaggerate the Iraqi threat, and they are thus surprisingly loquacious (delighting those of us in journalism). They emphasize that even if weapons of mass destruction still turn up, there is a fundamental problem —not within the intelligence community itself, but with senior administration officials — particularly in the Pentagon. "As an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I know how this administration has lied to the public to get support for its attack on Iraq," one of my informants rages. Some others see a pattern not so much of lying as of self-delusion — and of subjecting the intelligence agencies to those delusions. One has to take the outrage among the spooks with a few grains of salt because the intelligence folks have been on the losing end of a power struggle with the Pentagon. But that's the problem: the Pentagon has become the 800-pound gorilla of the Bush administration, playing a central role in foreign policy and intelligence as well as military matters. "The basic problem here is that O.S.D. [Office of the Secretary of Defense] has become too powerful," noted Patrick Lang, a former senior official in the Defense Intelligence Agency. One step came in the Clinton administration, when the defense secretary gained greater control over the handling of images from spy satellites. Mr. Rumsfeld then started up his own intelligence shop in the Pentagon. The central philosophy of intelligence — that it should be sheltered from policy considerations to keep it honest — was deeply bruised. A commission led by Brent Scowcroft suggested two years ago that intelligence functions be consolidated under the director of central intelligence. It was an excellent idea — killed by, among others, Mr. Rumsfeld. My own limited encounters with spies reinforce the idea that intelligence needs to be digested by professionals rather than cherry-picked by ideologues. I remember one spy who would call me up periodically for lunch when I lived in China. He would pass on amazing inside tidbits about China's top leaders — and then ask for copies of classified Chinese documents I had obtained. I kept putting him off because I wasn't going to share my documents — but I did want his scoops. Unfortunately, I could never confirm them, so they were unusable. Finally, it dawned on me that he was simply fabricating juicy tidbits so he would have something to trade. That's the way the intelligence game sometimes operates: the information is voluminous, confusing and contradictory, and prone to abuse, and it needs to be protected from policy makers rather than massaged to make them feel good. "The president is a very powerful guy," said Ray Close, who spent 26 years in the C.I.A. "When you sense what he wants, it's very difficult not to go out and find it." As best I can reconstruct events, Mr. Rumsfeld genuinely felt that the C.I.A. and D.I.A. were doing a horrendous job on Iraq — after all, he was hearing much more alarming information from those close to Ahmad Chalabi. So the Pentagon set up its own intelligence unit, and it sifted through everyone else's information and goaded other agencies to come up with more alarmist conclusions. "He's an ideologist," one man in the spy world said of Mr. Rumsfeld. "He doesn't start with the facts, even though he's quite brainy. He has a bottom line, and then he gathers facts to support the bottom line." That is not, of course, a capital offense. Pentagon leaders should feel free to disagree strenuously with foolish judgments by the C.I.A. But for the process to work, top C.I.A. officials need to fight back. Instead, George Tenet rolled over. "Tenet sided with the D.O.D. crowd and cut the legs out from under his own analysts," said Larry Johnson, a retired C.I.A. analyst. Does this mean that Mr. Tenet should be fired? I don't think so. Despite his failure to stand up for his people, he should not be made a scapegoat for problems that arose primarily from the Pentagon's zealotry — and ousting him would leave O.S.D. more powerful than ever. "There was a collective failure here," one senior person in the intelligence world said. "At the end of the day, it should not be George left out to dry." Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company This seems a fair description of what I have believed of this administration. For all his training in business administration, Bush has not required the various agencies to do their own jobs and leave the jobs of others to those other agencies. Instead, Rumsfield has amassed a great deal of personal power in the federal government, and is taking on to himself jobs for which he is not especially trained and does not have the necessary organizational resources. Particularly, Rumsfield has been setting foreign policy, as well as defense policy. It is also now clear that he is also attempting to determine the results of Intelligence, based not on the intelligence sources and a reasonable evaluation of their reliability, but instead based on the policy he has already decided on and wants the Intelligence to support. The top Brass of the military haven't made that mistake, so they were able to show their competence in Iraq. Unfortunately, the political levels of this administration have not shown similar competence, and this is a major reason why. They act on their ideology, not on what the facts indicate they should do. This, oddly enough, is exactly the same mistake made by the Communist leaders of the USSR. |
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