No one seems to be writing opinion pieces quite the way I would, so I decided to do it myself.

The name? Taverns are places where one goes to discuss the interesting events and things in the world, so this is my tavern.

I will offer my views on politics, economics, and whatever else strikes my fancy.
I will occasionally publish the entire article from another journal for purposes of causing discussion.

 

Why Was the Department of Defense Briefing the CIA on Intelligence About WMD?

The New Republic

What do you want to bet that the CIA doesn't complete the review of the Intelligence leading to the Iraq War II before the 2004 election? Or at least, it won't be released. Wouldn't wnat to endanger methods and sources used by the DOD office set up to provide the answers the Neocons wanted, now would you?

DOUG FEITH SELF-DESTRUCTS: Forget the Tanenhaus-Wolfowitz transcript. The latest astonishing news out of the Pentagon is yesterday morning's press briefing with Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith. Feith, a leading administration hawk, took to the podium to quash the emerging story that the Pentagon pressured or politicized intelligence on Iraq--particularly as it related to Iraq's ties to terrorism and its weapons of mass destruction--so policymakers (and the public) would only hear information that supported the hawkish argument. Alas, as the transcript reveals, the damage-control project is quickly unraveling.
Feith began by assailing the "goulash of inaccuracies" about the Defense Department's internal intelligence unit. In truth, he said, the tiny office was established a month after 9/11 to review previously collected intelligence about terrorism and "to think through what it means for the Defense Department to be at war with a terrorist network"--not to examine Iraq, and not to examine weapons of mass destruction. Feith conceded that the unit "came up with some interesting observations about the linkages between Iraq and Al Qaeda" and then presented them to the CIA in the summer of 2002. But he insisted that the unit's review of the Iraq-Al Qaeda link was "incidental." Furthermore, Feith said it was "flatly not true" that the unit "developed the case on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction," and argued that the intelligence assessments of the threat from Iraq's WMD stayed consistent with the Clinton administration's. And most important, he said it's "not true" that "the reason this team was created was because we wanted the intelligence looked at in a different way."

You would be forgiven for asking: What? Doesn't that last point contradict most of what Feith just said? And how could Feith say that the intelligence unit was only "incidentally" involved with Iraq if it briefed the CIA on the Iraq-Al Qaeda link, which many inside the intelligence community considered dubious? (His characterization is disputed by numerous current and former officials quoted in today's Washington Post, including one who said "there was a very aggressive search" for links.) What's more, what would be the point of a new intelligence-analysis shop on terrorism if not to explore weapons of mass destruction and state-sponsors like Iraq? And that's exactly what one very alert reporter asked:

Q: But the third point was you said there's no connection between this team and WMD. But you've just said that the relationship between terrorists and terrorist states and WMD has been--is--that was--demonstrated how they--

Feith: No, I didn't mean no connection between the team and WMD. If I said that, I misstated it. What I said is it was not the purpose or the special focus of this team to look at WMD. Its focus was to look at terrorist networks and the connection.

Q: (Inaudible.)--terrorist networks, and you've just explained how what 9/11 demonstrates is that terrorist networks and WMD and their acquisition thereof are importantly intertwined. And so, how do you not look at WMD when you're looking at terrorist networks in the case of Iraq?

Feith: No, I didn't mean to suggest that they didn't look at WMD at all. I'm saying that the mission that this team was given was not: Look at WMD. The mission that they were given was: Help us understand how these different organizations relate to each other and to their state sponsors.

Q: That may not have been their stated mission, but certainly that's one of the things they found, right?

Feith: I imagine--yes, I imagine that they looked at WMD along with other stuff. All I'm saying is it was not as it is portrayed in a number of erroneous press stories that we've read. It was not the purpose of this group to focus on the WMD issue.
At this point, like something out of a movie, a staff aide interjects:
Sir, I hate to bring this to a close, but I know you're at the end of your time here. Maybe you can take one or two more.
Feith went on to non-answer several more questions about why the CIA didn't conduct this terrorism-analysis review and whether there was any pressure from the Pentagon on intelligence analysts ("Who knows what people perceive?") before walking away from the podium. But the damage was done. As Eric Schmitt reports in today's New York Times, one defense official offended by Feith's effort concluded, "There was a lot of doublespeak out there." Even that seems generous to us.
posted by Richard at 10:29 PM